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Abstract 
When will a platform specialize in a sector and when a platform will choose to contain a variety of sectors? In 
reality, we see that specialized platforms like specialized markets and malls with a variety of sectors coexist. 
This paper tries to investigate the reasons for specialization in a sector when the platform size is limited and 
when the platform size is not limited in a two sided market context. 
Keywords: two-sided markets, specialization 
 
1. Introduction 
Specialized platforms like complexes where only furniture producers meet with the customers coexist with 
complexes like malls which carry a variety of sectors like food, shoes and apparel. Platforms like Google Play 
which choose to include mostly free or low priced applications coexist with platforms like Apple Store which 
choose to include priced applications. 
Some shopping malls are specialized to be outlets. For example, in Ankara, 4 out of a total of 22 shopping 
malls are specialized to be outlets. 1 out of 22 malls in Ankara is specialized in evening dresses with 44 shops 
out of 198 shops and also specialized in casual wear with 57 shops out of 198 shops. 1 out of 22 malls in Ankara 
is specialized in home decoration with 9 shops out of 42 shops which also excludes shoes and bags sector. 
Specialization of different areas in different products may be an endogenous process.(Krugman, 1991) 
Specialization in matching markets occur in two sided bee and flower markets. Bees may specialize in particular 
flowers where the maximum number of specialist bees is bounded.(Peleg, Shmida and Ellner, 1992) 
The variety effects the side to be charged and the prices for each side of the market. Accordingly, as the 
substitutability of the products increase, a monopoly will prefer to charge more to the consumer side than 
producers side. That is because the consumer surplus is increasing relatively more than the producers 
surplus.(Hagiu,2009) Shape of the utility function also effects the equilibrium; when the workers are gross 
substitutes in a two sided matching labor market a stable equilibrium exists.(Kelso and Crawford, 1982) 
Size of the platform may change according to competition level and the type of externatities. The market is 
segmented in equilibrium when the competition within sellers side is harsh. On the other hand when the 
competition is mild an agglomeration equilibrium exists.(Karle, Peitz and Reisinger, 2016) Different sized 
platforms may exist at the same time but larger platforms are the efficient platforms in the presence of positive 
network effects between sides and negative network effects
1
 within sides (Anderson, Ellison and Fudenberg, 
2008) 
The mall may charge different prices for different brands or different floors with the aim of product 
differentiation. Product differentiation of the intermediaries leads to tipping of the market to only one platform if 
there is quality competition. But with price competition both platforms will be included. (Brangewitz and 
Manegold, 2016) 
This paper investigates the reasons of specialization in two sided markets; when the platform size is limited 
and when the platform size is not limited. In the model the two sides of the market consists of consumers and 
producers side. The model contains a utility function where consumers have a taste for variety in each sector of 
sectors in the platform they join. There are two sectors of producers, producing different products. Producers 
may join the platform to meet the consumers. In a mall, the rental rates may be different, a mall can charge 
different prices to different sectors, thus the model allows product differentiation; platforms can distinguish 
between different sectors and can charge different rental rates to different sectors. Section 1 searches for the 
cases where a monopolist may exclude certain sectors thus specialize in other sectors. Section 2 investigates the 
case of duopoly, if it is possible for one platform to specialize in one sector and the other platform in  the other 
sector. 
 
2. The Model 
The two sides of the market are the consumers side and producers side. Producers are said to have shops on the 
platform they join and meet the consumer through the shops. Consumers meet the shops of the platform they 
join. There are two sectors where producers of these sectors produce 2 goods, Good  and good . First, it is 
assumed that the number of producers in a platform is not limited; the platforms are big enough to carry all 
                                                
1 See Kurucu 2008 
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demand from consumers side and producers side.  is the number of shops that offer good  and  is the 
number of shops that offer good . Number of total consumers are assumed to be equal to a continuum of 1, 
similarly there is a continuum of 1 total  producers and a continuum of 1 total  producers. Therefore the 
utility of a consumer from joining platform  can be written as: 
 
where  is the number of firms in platform  sector  where .  depends on the consumer demand for 
platform , . Producer   maximizes its profits and choose the platform to join accordingly. The profit 
of a producer  for joining platform  can be written as follows: 
 
 is the revenue of brand  where  is the demand of consumers for platform  and  the rent that 
platform  charges to producers of sector . It is assumed that costs are increasing with ,  and . 
The profits of a platform  can be written as: 
 
Optimal prices and quantities are determined in a two stage game. In the first stage platform(s) set ,  and . 
The model allows for product differentiation, the platform can set   and  different from each other. In the 
second stage consumers and producers decide to join the platform or not. In the second stage, given that ,  





3. The Case of Monopoly 
First, assume that the monopoly platform is big enough to be able to include all consumers and producers in the 
market. The monopolist incurs costs of  where  depends on ,  and . First order 
conditions for profit maximization are derived from , and   where  and ,   
, ,  and , . Marginal cost of , increasing 
consumer demand by 1 unit can be written as . Marginal cost of , increasing  producers by 1 unit 
can be written as . Marginal cost of , increasing  producers by 1 unit can be written as 




where  is the revenue from including  and  is the total cost of including . From 
there it can be written as profits of a monopoly platform  from consumer side is equal to .  
is the revenue from including ,  and  is the total cost of including , .  and 
 are cross price elasticities of  with respect to  and .  is the price elasticity of  and  is the 
price elasticity of  is the price elasticity of .  and  are the cross price elasticities of  and 
 with respect to . 
 depends on profits from consumer side and cost of including  side, weighted by the elasticities. Cost 
of  effects  positively when ,  is inelastic with respect to . But when ,  is 
elastic with respect to , cost of  effects  negatively. In that case, it can be concluded that  and markups 
are decreasing with elasticity in general. When ,  is negatively effected by  per  
producer and when , price is positively effected by  per  producer, elasticity  is 
important in determining which side to make profits from. To increase its revenues from the consumer side, 
platform chooses to put a negative markup over costs. When it is elastic platform charges a positive markup over 
costs and the revenues will fall due to network effects of the consumer side. 
When  is elastic, the effect of  on  and therefore  will be high. A high  will have a 
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decreasing effect on  when  is elastic,  will have a subsidization effect on ;  will be 
lower to subsidize consumer side as  an increase in  will decrease , thus will be lower. 
Note that in this case, if  is higher, then the subsidization effect on the A side will be more due to . 
When  is inelastic the effect of   on  will be negligible, thus platform will prefer to raise the revenues 
from  side due to positive network effects of  side on consumer demand Profits from consumers will have a 
positive effect on revenues from  side due to network effects. An increase in  will increase , revenues 
from  side, as , an increase in  will increase . Markups on costs will be negative when  
 is inelastic and positive when  is elastic 
For specialization in , conditions for exclusion of  side,  is searched. The necessary condition for 
the platform to exclude  producers is 
 
In this case neither covering the costs of producers of  side nor profits from consumer side is more 
important than the other. Platform is in between charging positive prices to cover costs from producers of  and 
subsidizing producer of  to increase profits from the demand side. Thus it can be concluded that, a platform 
earns from the difference between  and , if costs are higher, profits from consumer demand 
side is relatively negligible and  to cover up high costs of including producers But if profits from 
demand side due to  is high and costs are relatively negligible, in that case, platform will subsidize  side by 
 
Assume that the size of the monopoly platform is small so that , the sum of the total number of  
producers and the total number of  producers is bigger than the total slots  available for producers in the 
monopoly platform  and monopoly incurs no costs. When the number of firms in sectors is not 
fixed, , the monopoly will not be specialized in one sector but will include all sectors and include the 
varieties within sectors, the tipping equilibrium will occur. That is because there is no loss of including more 
sectors but an increase in consumer and producers surplus. Platform can earn more by including  and   
by setting ,  and  low enough. Subsidizing of a sector or consumers side is also possible. 
Consumers have a preference either for specialization or for variety. Consumers preference is reflected on 
the their utility function. A utility function which is convex in  and  is said to reflect a preference for variety 
and a utility function which is concave in  and  is said to reflect a preference for specialized platforms. 
Suppose that available places of the monopolist for shops is fixed and the platform is small enough, as in 
the case of a mall, platform may choose to specialize or include variety of sectors. Assume that the platform is 
small such that the maximum number of shops is . In that case the optimal choice of  and  will be such 
that . Of the total number of shops, is the number of shops that offer good , the total number 
of shops offering good  is  and  is the number of shops that offer good , the total number of shops 
offering good  is   where . Below, the cases are shown where a monopoly can choose variety 
or specialization when the number of available places for producer shops is fixed a in either case where 
consumer preferences may be in favor of variety or specialization. 
When the utility of consumer is convex in  and , meaning that consumers have a preference for variety 
and if the size of the monopoly is fixed meaning the number of available places for new shops is fixed, 
monopoly may choose specialization over variety depending on . It is assumed that  <0. If a monopoly can 
increase its profits with a change in  and  at points  and   
which are the corner solutions where platform specializes in one sector, then, monopoly is said to choose variety 
over specialization.  can be written as . At point   if monopoly increases the number of 
firms in sector , where  it will increase profits if . 
 
which can be written as 
 
 because for a convex utility function at point , as  is substituted for  the utility of the 
consumer rises. Remember that  as . 
For an interior solution above equation should hold. This is when  is large enough and  is low 
enough. As  and  are large enough the shape of the utility function becomes more important and forces an 
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interior solution as the consumers surplus rises with an increase in utility of the consumer.  points to a 
revenue higher from the side of product  compared to side , in that case it is profitable to substitute  for . 
To rule out corner solution at point , the condition is similar. 
 
For an interior solution  and  should be high enough, meaning, the shape of the utility function be 
more important. It is required that  is low enough; the optimal rents for brands  and  should not be 
different from each other. The rent difference leads to a revenue difference and thus can lead to an interior 
solution. Corner solutions happen if  is low enough and  is big enough. If the shape of the utility 
function is less convex, it can allow an interior solution. Remember that when the utility function is 
concave  negative network externalities dominate. For a utility function that is concave in and , 
similar equations apply; if either of the following conditions hold, it points to a corner solution. 
 
 
Again, when  or  are high enough the importance of the shape of the utility function increases and 
forces a corner solution as the consumers surplus rises with an increase in utility of the consumer. 
 
4. The Case of Duopoly 
Assume that there are two platforms competing with each other. It is possible for platform 1 to specialize in  
producers (and the other platform to specialize in  producers) if profits of platform 1 are decreasing with , 
the number of  producers that platform 1 includes, but increasing in , the number of  producers that 
platform  includes, and ,  the number of consumers that platform  includes. Thus platform  to specialize in 
 producers profits of platform  should be decreasing with the number of  producers at ;  
 
Note that . The left side of the equation should be low enough, for this either  or  or  
or a combination of them should be low enough.  means either negative network externalities are 
present or price for the consumer side is negative or low enough such that the loss from consumer side is large. A 
negative  may also decrease profits from  side, platform may not be able to cover the costs. Similarly 
 means either negative network externalities are present or price for A side is negative such that the 
loss from  side is large. When  is low enough, meaning low positive or negative 
externalities exist and the revenues from  side is low due to a low , with a high marginal cost of  increases 
the probability of exclusion of  side. 
For platform  to specialize in producers of , the profits should be increasing at the point where . 
An option is that the positive externalities of the consumer demand side should be positive with a high price for 
the consumers. A higher price for the consumers increase the revenue from the consumer side with an increase in 
the number of  producers. A positive  means positive revenues from the producers of . Externalities on the 
 side should be positive with a high price for  producers. A higher price for producers of good  increase the 
revenue from the  side with an increase in the number of  producers. Also for specialization in  side it is 
required that . 
When the number of producers in the market is fixed, platforms will engage in price competition. Platforms 
strategy will be to decrease all of and  to capture the market. Assume that when  and  
firm  can set the quantities  and  and that  and , firm  will accept the 
remaining quantity of firms. If  and , the market will be divided into two,  and 
  
Strategies for Firm i will be: 
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If there is an  such that <  for all  set   
It can be observed that there is no Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. Let  be the profit 
maximizing price schedule for a monopoly platform. It cannot be an equilibrium price schedule for firm  in a 
duopoly as firm  can increase its profits by setting  lower than . This will derive profits to 
. When  and  and  , firm  sets the quantities  and  that maximizes 
profits of a monopoly. The price competition will continue until  and . This cannot 
be an equilibrium because a firm  can increase its profits by decreasing  and  a little bit and capture the 
quantities  and , unless  and . Allow  and  which corresponds to  and  
maximize the profits when  At this time dividing the market into two  and 
will result in  will result in a loss. Therefore, firm  will not operate. If firm  does 
not operate than firm  will set monopoly prices and earn monopoly profits. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, it is shown that when the benefits of inclusion of a side is equal to cost of inclusion, a monopolist 
will maximize its profits by excluding that side from the market. That is, when the benefit of charging positive 
prices to cover costs from producers of a sector is equal to the cost of subsidizing producers of that sector to 
increase profits from the demand side, then the platform will exclude that side. When the number of slots in a 
platform is fixed, specialization occurs depending on the importance of shape of the utility function 
Specialization depends also on the optimal prices for each side If the optimal prices are close to each other, then, 
platform will have more incentives to prefer the interior solution. In the case of duopoly, for a platform to 
exclude a sector, it is required either that negative network externalities between sides play a role or the positive 
externalities are low. Another option is that the price charged for to be excluded side be negative enough for 
costs to exceed revenues from that side, or the price to be low enough. In the case of duopoly, if the number of 
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